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Anomaly Sequences Detection from Logs Based on Compression
Wang Nan, Han Jizhong, and Fang Jinyun
Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
Mining information from logs is an old and still active research topic. In recent years, with
the rapid emerging of cloud computing, log mining becomes increasingly important to industry.
This paper focus on one major mission of log mining: anomaly detection, and proposes a novel
method for mining abnormal sequences from large logs. Different from previous anomaly detection
systems which based on statistics, probabilities and Markov assumption, our approach measures the
strangeness of a sequence using compression. It first trains a grammar about normal behaviors using
grammar-based compression, then measures the information quantities and densities of questionable
sequences according to incrementation of grammar length. We have applied our approach on mining
some real bugs from fine grained execution logs. We have also tested its ability on intrusion detection
using some publicity available system call traces. The experiments show that our method successfully
selects the strange sequences which related to bugs or attacking.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
From trend analysing to system tuning, log mining tech-
nique is widely used in commercial and research area.
In recent years, diagnosing systems according to logs be-
comes a hot research topic because of the rapid emerg-
ing of cloud computing systems1–5. Problems in such
systems are always non-deterministic because they are
caused by uncontrollable conditions. Therefore, develop-
ers can watch neither the execution paths nor the com-
munications between different components as they used
to be. The only cute can be used are the text logs gen-
erated by buggy systems. However, the huge size of such
logs makes developers hard to deal with them.
Aiming at non-deterministic problems, many ap-
proaches are proposed. Record-replay6–9 is a hopeful one.
Record-replay systems record low level execution detail
during running. When debugging, they can replay the
buggy execution according to those data, let developers
to check control flow and data flow of the target pro-
grams. Nevertheless, although recent record-replay tools
can achieve low performance impact to be suitable for de-
ploying into production environments7,8, replaying 7x24
long lasting logs and manually identifying the key parts
of the execution flow is still an obstacle.
The heart of the above problems is finding unusual pat-
terns from large data set. This is the goal of intrusion
detection. There are 2 general approaches of intrusion de-
tection: misuse intrusion detection (MID) and anomaly
intrusion detection (AID). MID models unusual behav-
iors as specific patterns and identifies them from logs.
However, MID systems are vulnerable against unknown
abnormal behaviors. This paper focus on AID, which
models normal behaviors and reports unacceptable de-
viations. Anomaly detection has already been studied
for decades. The related techniques are used for detec-
tion of network intrusion and attacking10–13. Those ap-
proaches apply probability models and machine learning
algorithms11–13, most of them rely on Markov assump-
tion. They have achieved positive results on some spe-
cific type of logs such as system call traces11,13,14. How-
ever, although Markov assumption makes them sensitive
to unusual state transitions at low level, they are short
to identify high level misbehavior.
This paper proposes a novel anomaly detection
method. Different from the above approaches, our
method doesn’t rely on statistics, probabilities or Markov
assumption, and needn’t complex algorithms used in ma-
chine learning. The principle of our approach is straight-
forward: using compression to measure the information
quantities of sequences. Our method can be used to find
some high level abnormal behavior. To the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first attempt to utilize the re-
lationship between information quantities and compres-
sion in mining unusual sequences from logs.
We first introduce the principle of our approach using
a simple example in section II, then present the detail
algorithms in section III. Section IV lists a set of exper-
iments to show the ability of our method on bug finding
and intrusion detection. Section V concludes the paper.
II. OVERVIEW
Our approach is inspired from following obvious fact.
When the normal behavior of a information source is
known to the viewer, she can describe another normal se-
quence use only a few words, but needs more words to de-
scribe an abnormal sequence. For example, the viewer is
told that “1234 1235 1234 1235” are 4 normal sequences.
For a questionable sequence “1235”, she can describe it as
“another type II sequence”. The information contained
in her description is only the “type II”. However, for se-
quence “1237”, the most elegant description should be
“replace the forth character of normal pattern by 7”. The
information contained in this description is “forth” and
“7”. For sequence “32145”, she has to say “a new se-
quence, the first character is 3, the second character is
2 ...”. The information contained in this description is
much more than the previous two. Therefore, the viewer
2TABLE I: The size of gzipped data
n evaluated
sequence
gzipped sequence Qn In
0 1234123512341235 30 0
1 1234 12341235123412351234 30 0
2 1237 12341235123412351237 31 1
3 32145 12341235123412353214535 5
can infer that the last sequence is “the most strange one”.
An anomaly detection system should report the last se-
quence among the three.
In computer science there is a method to “describe a
sequence”: compression. A compression algorithm can
reduce the size of a sequence. For a long sequence, the
compressed data can be thought as “the description of
the original sequence”. It is well known that no com-
pression algorithm is able to ultimately reduce the size
of a sequence to zero. It is also well known that a com-
pressed file is hard to be compressed again, entropy rate
(H(X)) of the source data restricts the performance of a
compression algorithm.
Our approach utilizes the relationship between the in-
formation quantity and the compressed data size. To
select the “most strange” sequence, we can use the fol-
lowing 3 steps:
• Training: compress a set of normal sequences, the
compressed data size is Q0.
• Evaluating: for each candidate sequence, add it
into the normal set used in training step, com-
press the new set. The compressed size is Qn. Let
In = Qn −Q0.
• Selecting: the nth sequence which generates the
largest Qn is selected.
We use the previous example to demonstrate the above
3 steps. The compression algorithm is gzip.
The first row of table I shows the result of training.
Sequence 1234123512341235 is combined from 4 normal
sequences, gzip compresses it into 30 bytes. Following
rows show the evaluating step. 3 questionable sequences
are appended then gzipped. The incrementation of the
three are 0, 1 and 5. The third step selects 32145 as “the
most strange” one as it generates the largest In.
III. DETAIL
In this section we introduce our approach in detail.
A. Grammar-based compression algorithm
Although we use gzip algorithm to explain the principle
of our anomaly detection method in section II, gzip and
other well known generic compression algorithms are not
suitable for digging anomaly sequences from execution
logs because of the following reasons:
• Nearly all well known compression algorithms (such
as gzip, bzip2 and rar) are based on LZ7715, which
uses sliding window to store recent data for match-
ing incoming stream and ignore previous data.
Sliding window is important for a generic compres-
sion algorithm for compressing speed. However, it
eliminates the historic knowledge about the data
source, makes those data effectless when compress-
ing new data.
• Generic compression algorithms compress data as
byte stream. Their alphabets are 256 possible bytes
from 0x0 to 0xff. However, the unit of execution
logs is log entry. A compression algorithm with al-
phabet made by possible entries can discover mean-
ingful patterns.
• Generic compression algorithms are unable to iden-
tify difference sequences when training and evalu-
ating. Sequences in execution logs have to be stick
together one by one. Some patterns will be cre-
ated unintentionally across different sequences and
affect the evaluating processing. In previous exam-
ple, generic compression algorithms take pattern
“34123” into account although it is not a part of
any sequences.
Our approach chooses a grammar-based codes as
the underlying compression algorithm. Grammar-based
compression algorithms are developed recent decades as a
new way to losslessly compress data16–19. Kieffer et al.16
firstly published some important theorems on it. This
paper uses same symbols and terminologies to describe
the algorithm. Yang et al.17 presented a greedy grammar
transform. Our algorithm is based on it. Such grammar
transform is similar to SEQUITUR18,19, but generates
more compact grammars.
The idea of grammar-based compression is simple: for
stream x, one can represents it as a context-free gram-
mar Gx which generates language {x} and takes much
less space to store. Grammar-based compression is suit-
able for compressing execution logs because such logs are
generated by program hierarchically and are highly struc-
tured.
1. Grammar transform overview
Grammar transform converts a sequence x into an ad-
missible grammar Gx that represents x. An admissible
grammar Gx is such a grammar which guarantees lan-
guage L(G) = {x}. (The language of Gx contains only
x.) We define G = (V, T, P, S) in which
• V is a finite nonempty set of non-terminals.
• T is a finite nonempty set of terminals.
3• P is a finite set of production rules. A production
rule is an expression of the form A → α, where
A ∈ V , α ∈ (T ∪ V )+. (α is nonempty).
• S ∈ V is start symbol.
Define fG to be endomorphism on (V (G)∪T (G))
∗ such
that:
• fG(a) = a, a ∈ T (G)
• fG(A) = α, A ∈ V (G) and A→ α ∈ P (G)
• fG(ǫ) = ǫ
• fG(u1u2) = fG(u1)fG(u2)
Define a family of endomorphism {fk : k = 0, 1, 2, · · · }:
• f0G(x) = x for any x
• f1G(x) = fG(x)
• fkG(x) = fG(f
k−1
G (x))
Kieffer et al. showed16 that, for an admissible gram-
mar Gx, f
|V (Gx)|
Gx
(u) ∈ (T (Gx))
+ for each u ∈ (V (Gx) ∪
T (Gx))
+, and f
|V (Gx)|
Gx
(Gx(S)) = x. Informally speaking,
for an admissible grammar Gx, by iteratively replacing
non-terminals with the right side of corresponding pro-
duction rules, every u ∈ (V (G) ∪ T (G))+ will finally be
translated into a string which contains only terminals.
Define a mapping f∞G such that f
∞
G (u) = f
|V (G)|
G (u) for
each u ∈ (V (G) ∪ T (G))+. Informally speaking, f∞G (u)
is the original sequence represented by u.
2. The greedy grammar transform algorithm
The algorithm we used is based on following reduction
rules (in following description, α and β represent string
in (V (G) ∪ T (G))∗):
1. For an admissible grammar G, if there is a non-
terminal A which appears at right side of produc-
tion rules only once in P (G), let A→ α be the pro-
duction rule corresponding to A, let B → β1Aβ2
be the only rule which contain A in its right side,
remove A from V (G) and remove A → α from
P (G), then replace the production rule of B by
B → β1αβ2.
2. For an admissible grammar G, if there is a pro-
duction rule A → α1βα2βα3 where |β| > 1, add
a new non-terminal B into V (G) then create a
new rule B → β, replace the production of A by
A→ α1Bα2Bα3.
3. For an admissible grammar G, if there are two
production rules A1 and A2 that A1 → α1βα2
and A2 → α3βα4, in witch |β| > 1 and either
|α1| > 0 or |α2| > 0, either |α3| > 0 or |α4| > 0,
#Transform x into an admissible grammar
#returns the start rule by p0, other rules by G
def GrammarTransform (x ) :
G = {}
p0 = SeqTransform (x , G)
return p0 , G
#x is the sequence to be transform
#G is a set of production rules
#output: return the start symbol px so that f∞G (px) = x,
# all other rules are added into G
def SeqTransform (x , G ) :
px = Sx → ǫ
while |x| > 0 :
#greedy read ahead and match
for p in G :
v = left side of p
check whether f∞G (v) is x’s prefix
i f matched :
v = the longest matched nonterminal
append v after the right side of px
pop |f∞
G
(v)| entries from x
else :
pop one entry t from x
append t as a terminal after the right side of px
apply reduction rules 1-3 iteratively over G ∪ {px},
until non of them can be applied.
newly created rules are added into G
return px
FIG. 1: Greedy grammar transform algorithm
add a new non-terminal B into V (G) then create
a new rule B → β, replace the production of A1
by A1 → α1Bα2, replace the production of A2 by
A2 → α3Bα4.
Figure 1 illustrates the grammar transform
algorithm17. It is very similar to SEQUITUR18,19
except the greedy read ahead step, which guarantees
that in the generated grammar G, for different v ∈ V (G),
f∞G (v) are different.
Algorithm in figure 1 transforms a sequence into a
context-free grammar. To avoid patterns across differ-
ent sequences interfering the processing, we wrap the al-
gorithm as figure 2. In the wrapped algorithm, we can
guarantee that every execution sequences are represented
by an non-terminal in the right side of p0. The reduction
rules never consider patterns across sequences because p0
is not in G. In figure 2 we also show that our algorithm
eliminates redundant sequences by dropping those results
which contain only one symbol.
In table II we explain the above algorithm using an
example of computing a grammar for 4 sequences 1234
1235 1234 1237. The final grammar is listed at the last
row in the table.
We measure the quantities of information of a se-
quence by computing the number of additional symbols
which it introduces into the grammar. Figure 3 de-
scribes the evaluating process. After a grammar gen-
erated, EvaluateSequence is used to compute the infor-
mation quantity (I) and information density D (average
4# logs is a set of sequences
def LogTransform ( l og s ) :
G = {}
p0 = S0 → ǫ
for seq in l o g s :
pn = SeqTransform (seq , G)
i f pn contains only one symbol in its right side :
drop pn
continue
insert pn into G
append pn after the right side of p0
return (p0 , G)
FIG. 2: Transform a set of sequences
TABLE II: Example of 4 sequences: 1234 1235 1234 1237
processed pn G p0
string
begin process sequence 1234
p1 → ǫ {} p0 → ǫ
1234 p1 → 1234
begin process a new sequence 1235
p2 → ǫ {p1}, p1 → 1234 p0 → p1
12 p2 → 12
apply rule 3 on pattern 12
p2 → pa {p1, pa}, p1 → pa34
pa → 12
123 p2 → pa3
apply rule 3 on pattern pa3
p2 → pb {p1, pa, pb}, p1 → pb4
pa → 12, pb → pa3
apply rule 1 on pa
{p1, pb}, p1 → pb4
pb → 123
1235 p2 → pb5
begin process a new sequence 1234
p3 → ǫ {p1, pb, p2}, p1 → pb4 p0 → p1p2
pb → 123, p2 → pb5
look ahead greedy match:
p1 and pb matched, |f
∞
G
(p1)| is the longest
1234 p3 → p1
begin process a new sequence 1237
p3 contains only 1 symbol, eliminate p3
p4 → ǫ p0 → p1p2
look ahead greedy match:
pb matched
123 p4 → pb
1237 p4 → pb7
finish processing
{p1, pb, p2, p4}, p1 → pb4 p0 → p1p2p4
pb → 123, p2 → pb5
p4 → pb7
symbols produced by an entry) of a sequence x. To illus-
trates the evaluating process, we evaluate sequences 2238
and 1239 using G generated by table II.
From the above table, 2238 is more strange than 1239.
# Count the number of total symbols which is needed for
# describing all rules in rules
def EvaluateRules ( ru l e s , G ) :
v = 0
pr oc e s s ed ru l e s = {}
for r in r u l e s :
i f r is in processedrules:
continue
pr oc e s s ed ru l e s . i n s e r t (r )
#r is a production rule with the form A→ α
v += |α|
for symbol in α :
i f symbol is nonterminal :
rn = G [ symbol ]
i f rn not in pr oc e s s ed ru l e s :
r u l e s . append (rn )
return v
# x is the sequence which is to be evaluated
# p0 and G are parameters of an already computed grammar
def EvaluateSequence (x , p0 , G ) :
G′ = G #deep copy
pn = SeqTransform (x , G′ )
i n f o o l d = EvaluateRules ({p0} , G)
info new = EvaluateRules ({p0, pn} , G′ )
I = info new − i n f o o l d
D = I / |x|
return I , D
FIG. 3: Evaluation of a new sequence
TABLE III: Evaluation of 2 sequences
G 2238 1239
p0 → p1p2p4
pb → 123
p1 → pb4
p2 → pb5
p4 → pb7
p2238 → 2pc8
p0 → p1p2p4
pb → 1pc
pc → 23
p1 → pb4
p2 → pb5
p4 → pb7
p1239 → pb9
p0 → p1p2p4
pb → 123
p1 → pb4
p2 → pb5
p4 → pb7
12 symbols 16 symbols 14 symbols
I = 4 I = 2
D = 1 D = 0.5
B. Anomaly detection based on compression
We introduced out anomaly detection algorithm in this
subsection.
The goal of the algorithm is to find abnormal sequences
in given logs. The input are two data sets. One set
contains some normal sequences, the other set contains
questionable sequences. From the later set our algorithm
reports abnormal sequences.
The algorithm can be divided into following steps:
1. Training: transform the normal set Sn into an ad-
missible grammar G with S(G) = p0.
2. Evaluating: for each sequences tn in ques-
tionable set Sq, compute (Itn , Dtn) using
EvaluateSequence(tn, p0, G).
3. Reporting: report m1 sequences which generates
5...
main:/../../server.c:516
main:/../../server.c:536
main:/../../server.c:538
server_init:/../../server.c:170
server_init:/../../server.c:172
...
FIG. 4: Sample ReBranch trace
largest m1 Itn , report m2 sequences which gener-
ates largest m2 Dtn . m1 and m2 are configurable.
We report abnormal sequences according to both I and
D because we believe they are both meaningful. A se-
quence x which generates large Ix indicates that there
is no a similar sequence in Sn. However, if x is a very
long sequence, the symbols used to describe x may be at
very high level. Compare with a short sequence y with
Iy ≅ Ix, y is more valuable.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
A. Fine grained execution log
We tested the ability of our method on finding bugs
in fine grained execution log. The data sets we used are
generated using ReBranch9. ReBranch is a record-replay
tool for debugging. It records the outcome of all branch
instructions when running, and replay the execution ac-
cording to these logs for debugging. We converted the
traces into line number sequences. Figure 4 shows a piece
of sample trace.
We tried our algorithm on finding two non-
deterministic bugs in lighttpd (a light weight web
server) and memcached (a key-value object caching sys-
tem).
In lighttpd bug 221720, sometimes a few of CGI re-
quests timeout. The bug is caused by a race condition:
when a child process exits before the parent process is
notified about the state of the corresponding pipe, the
parent will wrongly remove the pipe from the event pool
and never close the connection because it assumes the
pipe still contain data.
In our experiment on lighttpd bug, we first collected
a trace with 500 correct requests for training, then col-
lected another trace with 1000 requests for testing. 2 of
these 1000 requests timeout. Traces are pre-processed
to be divided into sequences. During the pre-processing,
signal handling are removed. A sequence begin at the en-
try of connection state machine() and end at the exit
point of that function. After pre-processing, the normal
trace contains 2501 sequences made by 3337395 entries,
the questionable trace contains 4996 sequences made by
6661425 entries.
memcached bug 10621 is combined by 2 bugs. We
first fixed a udp deadlock problem under the help of
ReBranch. After that, when the cache server receives a
TABLE IV: Test result of ReBranch data sets
lighttpd train result:
3337395 entries into 2793 symbols
top most 5 I top most 5 D
I654 = 41 D654 = 0.039653
I3990 = 41 D3990 = 0.039653
I1172 = 3 D655 = 0.019231
I1 = 1 D3991 = 0.019231
I2 = 1 D22 = 0.018868
memcached train result:
862636 entries into 582 symbols
top most 5 I top most 5 D
I1237 = 27 D1237 = 0.031765
I1608 = 27 D1608 = 0.031765
I1609 = 27 D1609 = 0.031765
I1 = 1 D1 = 0.009091
I2 = 1 D6 = 0.009091
magic udp packet, some of following udp requests won’t
get reply. The problem is cause by incorrect state trans-
fer. memcached uses a state machine when serving a
request. The incorrect state transfer is conn read ->
conn closing. The correct transfer sequence is more
complex.
In memcached experiment, we first collected a trace
with 1000 correct udp requests, then tried to identify 3
buggy requests out of 1003 new requests. As previous
experiment, we split traces into sequences. A sequence
begin at the entry point of event handler() and end at
the exit point of that function. After splitting, normal
trace data set contains 1442 sequences made by 862636
entries; questionable trace contains 1609 sequences made
by 883226 entries.
The results of the above 2 experiments are listed in
table IV. In lighttpd experiment, our algorithm find 2
sequences (654 and 3990) with I and D quite larger than
others. In memcached experiment, our algorithm find 3
strange sequences (1237, 1608 and 1609). We confirmed
those sequences are correct ones (buggy ones) by manu-
ally replaying.
It is hard to detect memcached 106 bug using tra-
ditional Markov-based intrusion detection method be-
cause the misbehavior is at a very high level. Markov-
based methods only consider the probabilities of one en-
try transfer to another entry. However, in this example,
state transfer operation is implemented by many lines,
each line transfer is valid. If developer know the dis-
tance between the key lines which represent a state trans-
fer, higher order Markov model or n-gram model can be
used. Nevertheless, for different program, developer have
to manually adjust the length of sliding window. Further-
more, computing higher order model requires much more
resources– always growths exponentially.
6data set traces procs entries
xlock-synth-unm 71 71 339177
xlock-intrusions 2 2 949
named-live 1 27 9230572
named-exploit 2 5 1800
...
229 2
229 1
370 66
370 5
370 63
...
FIG. 5: UNM data set sample and size
TABLE V: Test result of UNM data sets
xlock train result: 266563 entries into 6149 symbols
top most 5 normal sequences 2 exploited sequences
I5 = 776 D10 = 0.107226 Iq1 = 183 Dq1 = 0.372709
I8 = 89 D1 = 0.049743 Iq2 = 176 Dq2 = 0.380952
I1 = 87 D5 = 0.036998
I4 = 59 D6 = 0.032590
I10 = 46 D4 = 0.026375
named train result: 9215497 entries into 66148 symbols
top most 5 normal sequences 5 exploited sequences
I2 = 322 D2 = 0.031078 Iq2 = 90 Dq3 = 0.311688
I3 = 4 D3 = 0.003537 Iq5 = 70 Dq2 = 0.297030
I4 = 4 D5 = 0.003537 Iq3 = 24 Dq5 = 0.291667
I5 = 4 D4 = 0.002093 Iq1 = 1 Dq1 = 0.001681
I1 = 1 D1 = 0.001681 Iq4 = 1 Dq4 = 0.001681
B. System call sequences
We used the data set published by the University of
New Mexico14 to evaluate the ability of our algorithm on
intrusions detection. The published data sets are system
call traces generated using strace.
We applied our algorithm on xlock and named data
sets. Figure 5 shows the size of those data and some
sample entries in those traces. A trace entry contains
two numbers, the left one is process id, the right one
is the system call number. A trace in UNM data set
contains many processes.
We use our algorithm to identify exploited processes.
To achieve this, we splitted the original traces into system
call sequences according to process id. The entries in each
result sequences contain only the system call number. For
xlock, we randomly selected 61 processes sequences for
training then compared I andD of the other 12 sequences
(10 normal, 2 exploited); for named, we chose 22 of normal
sequences for training. The result is listed in table V.
In xlock result, information density (D) of the two
exploited sequences are 2 times larger than the largest
density in normal set. In named result, our algorithm
identified 3 strange sequences, information densities of
them are at different order of magnitude. The last 2
sequences generate only 1 symbol (I = 1), indicates that
same sequences have appeared in the training set at least
once. After checking we found that those 2 processes are
the parent processes used to setup daemons, none of them
is target of attacks.
TABLE VI: Processing speed
data set training evaluating
time throughput time throughput
(s) (ent/s) (s) (ent/s)
lighttpd 90.4 36918.1 496.3 13422.2
memcached 10.1 85409.5 28.7 30817.4
xlock 237.1 1124.3 166.7 442.1
named 15742.6 585.4 189.9 89.2
C. Performance
Finally we list the throughput of our algorithm in table
VI. It has been shown that SEQUITUR is a linear-time
algorithm18. Our algorithm is similar to SEQUITUR ex-
cept the read ahead matching. Such matching (match
a long string against many shorter strings and find the
longest match) can be optimized using a prefix tree.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a novel anomaly detection al-
gorithm by comparing the incrementation of compressed
data length based on grammar-based compression. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work which
uses compression to measure the strangeness of sequences
in anomaly detection. Different from Markov-based algo-
rithm, our method utilizes the full knowledge about the
structure of the data set. It can be used to find high level
misbehavior as well as low level intrusions. We tested the
algorithm on finding bugs in fine grained execution logs
and intrusion detection in system call traces. In both
data set, our method got positive result. The proposed
method is also applicable to text log generated by today’s
cloud computing systems.
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